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Treading Carefully After Shelby County:
Minority Coalitions Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
Audrey Yangt

I.

INTRODUCTION

While the Fifteenth Amendment's passage in 1870 granted
African-Americans suffrage,' it was not until 1965 that Congress
used its granted power to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(the "Act"). 2 Section 2 of the Act prohibits imposing voting
qualifications or prerequisites that result in a denial or
abridgement of any citizen's right to vote on account of their race
or color. 3 Congress amended the statute in 1975 to add language

minorities to the definition of minoritieS 4 and again in 1982 to
clarify that a Section 2 claim only required a showing of
discriminatory results and not discriminatory intent.5 After this
final Congressional clarification,6 the Supreme Court announced
three threshold elements required to state a Section 2 claim in
Thornburg v. Gingles, one of which requires the minority group
to be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute
a majority in the single-member district."7

t B.S., Cornell University, 2005; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law
School, 2016.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
2 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)).
3 See id. at§ 2.
4 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)) (defining language minority as citizens
from "environments where the dominant language is other than English").
' See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)).
6

See id.

478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).

701

702

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2015

The circuits are split over whether two minority groups can
aggregate their populations to meet the Gingles requirements
and bring a Section 2 claim. The Fifth Circuit held that Blacks
and Hispanics are permitted to aggregate their claims. 8 The
Eleventh, Ninth, and Second Circuits all implicitly assumed
that aggregation was permissible without actually performing
an analysis of it, possibly because they determined on other
grounds that the plaintiffs did not meet the Gingles
requirements for a Section 2 claim.9 The Sixth Circuit has
expressly disagreed, holding that minority coalitions conflict
with the statute's plain meaning and congressional intent. 10
While some scholarship supports the circuit majority view,
which permits aggregation of minority groups," virtually no
existing literature supports the circuit minority view, which
prohibits aggregation. 12 Minority coalitions contradict the threepart test of Gingles, which suggests a requirement of
homogeneity of the minority class. 13 Furthermore, recent
Supreme Court cases suggest that aggregating minority groups
was not Congress's intent. In Bartlett v. Strickland,14 the Court
rejected a crossover district, which can occur, for example, when
white voters combine with African-American voters to form a
majority. 15 While not the same as a minority coalition, the
rejection of crossover districts indicates that the Court would
maybe not support aggregation either. Additionally, in Perry v.
Perez,16 the Court found the district court's redistricting plans
suggested an attempt at creating a minority coalition district,
which the Court expressly said it did not have a right to do.17

" See Campos v. Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
9 See generally Sara Michaloski, Note, A Tale of Two Minority Groups: Can Two
Different Minority Groups Bring A Coalition Suit Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965?, 63 CATH. U.L. REV. 271 (2013); Laura R. Weinberg, Note, Reading the Tea
Leaves: The Supreme Court and the Future of Coalition Districts under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 411 (2013).
10 See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996).
" See generally Michaloski, supra note 9; Weinberg, supra note 9.
1 See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1393.
13 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (requiring
numerosity plus
geographic concentration and political cohesiveness, which would be redundant if
minorities could simply aggregate).
14

556 U.S. 1 (2009).

1s See id. at 25.
16 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012).
" See id. at 944 ("If the District Court did set out to create a minority coalition
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Moreover, potential voting rights plaintiffs may now have to

rely more heavily on Section 2 in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Shelby County v. Holder,18 which held Section 4(b) of
the Act unconstitutional. 19 Section 4(b) contained a coverage
formula to determine whether a jurisdiction had a history of
voting discrimination and would be subject to federal
preclearance for new voting legislation under Section 5.20
Without Section 4(b), Section 5 has no effect and eliminates an
important avenue of governmental oversight on states' decisions
regarding voting laws. 21 Thus, potential heavy reliance on
Section 2 means it could become too powerful of a tool if
expanded to allow minority coalitions. Shelby County also
suggests that the vote dilution problem is not the significant
issue it once was, implying that perhaps minority coalitions are
unnecessary under the Act. 22

This Comment examines the background of Section 2 of the
Act to determine whether permitting coalition suits is consistent
with congressional intent. Part I discusses the legislative history
of voting discrimination leading to the passage of the Act,
focusing on its intent and purpose. The early judicial
interpretations of the Act are discussed as well. Part II explains
the current circuit split regarding minority coalitions under
Section 2. And Part III discusses reasons why the circuit
minority view prohibiting minority coalitions is the proper
interpretation of the statute in light of the plain meaning of the
statute,
congressional intent,
current Supreme
Court
jurisprudence, and public policy. To band together minority
groups when the issue of voter dilution is not the significant
problem it once was would only tip the scales in the other
direction, by giving the minority groups an undue advantage.
A
minority
group
that
has
experienced
voting
discrimination can bring an action under Section 2.23 But if it
were so easy to aggregate minority groups to avoid vote dilution,
then this would render Section 2 superfluous. This Comment
district, rather than drawing a district that simply reflected population growth, it had no
basis for doing so.").
18 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
19

See id. at 2631.

'0

See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006) (abrogated in part by Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612).
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2619.
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014).

21

22
23
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concludes by suggesting an appropriate resolution regarding
permissibility of minority coalitions should likely be left to
Congress. Congress can properly assess the current situation,
look at the statistics, and decide based upon all of the data the
best course of action. The courts adjudicating issues between
specific parties do not necessarily have this information and
should be wary about a ruling that impacts such a significant
portion of the population.
II.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2 AND SUBSEQUENT
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

The Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of
1965

In 1870, the country ratified the Fifteenth Amendment,
which states: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." 2 4 The Supreme Court narrowly construed the reach
of the Fifteenth Amendment in its early cases. 25 Congress had
not enforced the powers bestowed to it by the Fifteenth
Amendment, so there was no private remedy, just the ability to
enjoin the states from passing legislation that discriminated
against voters based on race or color. 2 6 As such, existing facially
race-neutral state legislation did not infringe upon any
constitutional protections. 27
Nearly a century passed before Congress finally exercised
its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment and passed the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 giving minorities a way to bring
claims against discriminatory policies.2 8 Vote dilution primarily
arises when districts are drawn in such a manner that a
minority group, geographically concentrated, is split into
multiple districts denying the minority group strength in

24

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1876) (explaining
that the
Fifteenth Amendment does not confer an individual right of suffrage).
26 See id. at 218.
25

27

See id.

See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437
(codified as
amended in 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)).
28
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numbers, also known as "cracking." 29 Line drawers also dilute
votes by unnecessarily packing a minority into a single district
when the group's voting strength would be much greater if the
group were split across multiple districts, also known as
"packing."30 The passage of the Act gave these minority groups
an opportunity to combat these discriminatory practices by
giving them a private right of action. 31
B.

Section 2 of the Act and Subsequent Supreme Court Cases

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits voting
qualifications or prerequisites to be imposed that results in a
denial or abridgement of any citizens' right to vote on account of
their race or color. 32 The relevant portion states: "No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color." 33 A
progression of Supreme Court cases followed, each refining the
Court's interpretation of Section 2 of the Act.
First, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,3 4 the Court held
that the Act was a constitutional exercise of congressional power
under the Fifteenth Amendment. 35 In Chisom v. Roemer, 36 the
Court further determined that the Act applied to the election of
judges as well, even though the Act only referred to the election
of "representatives." 37 The Court subsequently, however, chose

See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14 (2009) (plurality opinion).
See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993).
31
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)).
32 Voting Rights Act § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2014).
29

30

as

Id.

383 U.S. 301 (1966).
See id. at 337 (finding certain provisions of the Act were constitutional, though
Section 2 was not challenged in the specific case, this case has stood for the proposition
that Congress does in fact have the power to enact legislation related to voting
regulation under the Fifteenth Amendment); but see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down Section 4(b) of the Act as unconstitutional).
36 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
37 Id. at 398-401; see Michaloski, supra note 9, at 293 (2013) (citing Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) as an example of the Court broadly interpreting the
statute, though it is suspect whether one or two examples is enough to warrant a
conclusion of broad interpretation).
34

3
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to interpret the Act narrowly in Mobile v. Bolden,38 when it
found that discriminatory results without a showing of
discriminatory intent was not enough to sustain a Section 2
claim. 39 Congress responded by amending the statute to make
clear that discriminatory intent was not necessary and that
plaintiffs need only show discriminatory effects. 40
C.

Gingles and Section 2 Voting Dilution Claim Requirements

Shortly after Congress amended the statute to clarify that
plaintiffs only needed to prove a discriminatory purpose and not
discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court decided Thornburg v.
Gingles to establish a three-part test for a vote dilution claim
under Section 2.41
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate
that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in the single-member district ....
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it
is politically cohesive .... Third, the minority must be
able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . .
to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate. 42
In announcing the three-part test, the Court looked to the
Senate
Judiciary
Committee
Majority
Report,
which
accompanied the amendment to Section 2 and had considered
several factors including, among others, the history of
discrimination and whether the political candidates of the
minority groups had ever been elected. 43
38

446 U.S. 55 (1980).

3

See id. at 62.
See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403-04.
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).

40
41
42

See id.

4 Id. at 36-37 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982)) (listing the factors
considered:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the
extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized; (3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single
shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the

TREADING CAREFULLY AFTER SHELBY COUNTY
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The Court noted that the "degree of racial bloc voting"
would vary based on the facts, such as "whether evidence that
black and white voters generally prefer different candidates"
would rise to the "level of legal significance under §2."44
The first Gingles element is akin to a numerosity plus
geographic concentration requirement, where the minority
group must be "sufficiently large" to constitute a "majority in a
single-member district." 45 As the Court explained, this
requirement is a "threshold matter" because "[u]nless minority
voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the
absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot
claim to have been injured."4 6 Thus, this standard "would only
protect racial minority votes from diminution proximately
caused by the districting plan; it would not assure racial
minorities proportional representation." 4 7 Allowing coalitions
would make it easier for minority groups to demonstrate that
they could form a majority in a single-member district. For
example, if Blacks and Hispanics both existed in a single
district, but neither comprised a majority, combining forces
would allow them to more easily attain majority status under
the first element.
The second Gingles element requires political cohesion. The
reasoning is "[i]f the minority group is not politically cohesive, it
cannot be said that the selection of a multi-member electoral
structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests." 4 8 A
minority group is considered politically cohesive "if it votes

opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is a
candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have
been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which members of the
minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6)
whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals; (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
44

4
4

Id. at 57-58.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
Id. at 50 n. 17.

47

Id.

4

Id. at 51.
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together." 49 Different minority groups, when aggregated, may be
less politically cohesive than single minority groups.5 0
The third Gingles element requires a showing that the
white majority sufficiently votes as a bloc to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.5 1 This requirement of racially
polarized voting does not require proof of causation or intent. 52
The Court further explained that while the Gingles
elements are "generally necessary to prove a §2 claim," they
must also be examined in the "totality of circumstances." 53 To
meet these conditions, courts began to rely on statistical data to
demonstrate the appropriate level of political cohesion and white
bloc voting. 54 Thus, the question of minority coalitions would
determine whether the plaintiff group would even qualify under
the first Gingles element, before the second and third elements
required analysis. Without minority coalitions, it is possible that
there are some potential plaintiff groups that would not even
meet the first element. Based on the progression of Section 2
jurisprudence, one cannot characterize the intermittent
decisions from the Court as exhibiting a pattern of broad or
narrow interpretation.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING PERMISSIBILITY OF MINORITY
COALITIONS UNDER SECTION 2

The circuit courts are split on whether two or more minority
groups can come together to form a coalition for the purposes of
the Gingles three-part test. The majority view, first announced
by the Fifth Circuit, is that coalitions are permissible under
Section 2.15 The Eleventh, Ninth and Second Circuits have not
taken a firm stance on the issue, but in Section 2 cases have
implicitly assumed that aggregation is permissible without

Campos v. Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
5 See Chelsea J. Hopkins, Comment, The Minority Coalition's Burden of Proof
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623, 647-48 (2012)
(explaining that political cohesion in the context of Asian-American communities are
difficult because of a variety of factors including the "length of time they have lived in
the United States, age, and cultural differences").
s' Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
4

Id. at 74.

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994). See also Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 46.
s See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993).
5

5

See generally Campos v. Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988).
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analysis, often resolving the claim on other grounds.5 6 The
Eleventh Circuit cited to the Fifth Circuit opinion in its analysis,
suggesting the court agrees with the Fifth Circuit, but it did not
independently analyze the issue.5 7 The Sixth Circuit, standing
alone, holds that coalitions are not permissible for
Section 2 claims.5 8
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
issue of what constitutes a "minority class," the Court has
refused to allow a vote dilution claim when the plaintiff class
was a combination of a minority group and majority group,
forming a crossover district.5 9 In Bartlett v. Strickland,60 the
minority group consisted of black voters and the majority group
consisted of white voters. The Court applauded the progress of
those districts with white voters voting for minority candidates;
however, it refused to mandate the creation of crossover
districts. 6 1 "Only when a geographically compact group of
minority voters could form a majority in a single-member
district has the first Gingles requirement been met." 62
The closest the Court has come to answering this question is
in Perry v. Perez,63 a case where it held that redistricting plans
could not stand if the purpose was to combine two minority
groups together to form a majority. The case did not directly
raise a Section 2 claim; rather, the redistricting plan was
challenged under Section 5.64 The Court suggested the
redistricting plans could have legitimately been the result of
population changes, but if population change was a pretext for
forming a minority coalition district, then the district court had
"no basis for doing so."65 The Court's reluctance to form a
minority coalition via redistricting could shed light on the
Court's sentiments regarding minority coalitions in general.
s6 See generally Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26
F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994); Badillo v. Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992); Concerned
Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990).
5' See Hardee Cnty., 906 F.2d at 526.
58 See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996).
5 See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 25.
6

See id.

6'

See id.

62

6

Id. at 26.
132 S. Ct. 934 (2012).
See id. at 940.

65

Id. at 944.

63
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Circuit Majority View Permitting Minority Coalitions under
Section 2

Currently, the majority of circuit courts that have ruled on
this issue have either explicitly or implicitly supported
aggregating minority groups for cases under Section 2. In
Campos v. Baytown, the Fifth Circuit aggregated Black and
Hispanic voters to form a minority group "sufficiently large" as
required by Gingles in order to find voter dilution.6 6 Black and
Hispanic voters brought suit because they claimed the city's
minority population of 25.4 percent would never command a
majority of votes required to elect a member supported by the
minority. 67 Baytown had an "at-large election system," which
had been in place since 1947.68 In fact, "[n]o minority
member . .
ha[d] ever been elected to the Baytown City
Council." 69 The court found that the plaintiffs satisfied all three
parts of the Gingles test. 70 In allowing aggregation of Blacks and
Hispanics, the court found that "[t]here is nothing in the law
that prevents the plaintiffs from identifying the protected
aggrieved minority to include both Blacks and Hispanics."7 1
Additionally, the court noted "'Congress itself recognized 'that
voting discrimination against citizens of language minorities is
pervasive and national in scope."'

72

In Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County
Board of Commissioners,73 the Eleventh Circuit stated that
"[t]wo minority groups ... may be a single section 2 minority if
they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive
manner," citing Campos.74 The court did not offer any of its own
analysis as to why the law supports aggregating two minority
groups. Additionally, the plaintiff class changed their theory of
recovery to only include Blacks after the district court found
that Blacks and Hispanics were not politically cohesive, thus,

6

See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244.

" Id. at 1241-42.
6
"
70
71
72
7
74

Id.
Id. at 1242.
Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244-49.
Id. at 1244.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(fXl)).
906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990).
See id. at 526 (finding that the two minority groups lacked political cohesion).
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the Eleventh Circuit offered no original analysis.7 5 Ultimately,
the court did not actually decide the aggregation issue, and any
statements it could have made on the issue of aggregation or
any accompanying explanations would have been, at best, dicta.
Similarly, in Badillo v. Stockton,76 the Ninth Circuit found that
the two minority groups were not politically cohesive, and thus
did not address the issue of aggregation under Section 2.7
And finally, in Bridgeport Coalitionfor FairRepresentation
v. City of Bridgeport,8 the Second Circuit implicitly supported
the possibility of aggregating minority coalitions. 79 The district
court found "'[wihite bloc voting in Bridgeport will dilute
minority voting except in districts in which clear [minoritymajorities] are established, by a single or a combination AfricanAmerican and Latino voters."'8 0 The court concluded there was
"sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the Coalition
satisfied its burden imposed by Gingles."8 1 The Second Circuit
agreed, however, the district court implicitly assumed that
aggregation was permissible. In a later Second Circuit opinion,
Pope v. County of Albany,8 2 the court acknowledged the circuit
split, and again allowed aggregation of Blacks and Hispanics to
satisfy the first part of the Gingles test. But the court found that
the plaintiffs failed the third Gingles element, so the court did
not discuss the permissibility of aggregating minority groups in
any detail.8 3
Circuit Minority View Denying Minority Coalitions under
Section 2

B.

The only court that has expressly denied aggregation of
minority coalitions under Section 2 is the Sixth Circuit. In Nixon
v. Kent County,84 a divided Sixth Circuit held that "[t]he
language of the Voting Rights Act does not support a conclusion

8

Id. at 527.
956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 886 (finding that the two minority groups lacked political cohesion).
26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994).
See id. at 275.
See id. (emphasis added).

81

See

'

'
"

7

id.

687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012).
8 See id. at 572 n. 5.
' 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
82
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that coalition suits are part of Congress' remedial
purpose . . . ."85 It further held that the primary duty of the
legislature and the State was to determine where to draw
political lines. 86 In Nixon, the plaintiff class of Blacks and
Hispanics brought a Section 2 claim opposing a redistricting
plan, which did not include any districts where the minority
group made up a majority.87 Before turning to the Gingles test,
the court had to decide whether it would allow aggregation of
minority groups. 8 To do this, the court began with a textual
analysis of the statute, taking into account the plain meaning of
the statute, congressional intent, and interpretation from other
courts. 89 The court then looked into the legislative history and

'

considered several policy concerns surrounding aggregation.90
The first step "in interpreting a statute is its language."9
The court noted the absence of any language mentioning
"minority coalitions, either expressly or conceptually." 9 2
Additionally, the statute consistently used "class" in the
singular form. 93 As a result, the court concluded that Congress
did not intend to protect minority coalitions and if it wanted to,
it could either "authorize coalition suits" or amend the statute to
use the plural form and refer to "protected classes" instead. 94
The court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute was
so clear it was unnecessary to look into the legislative history,
but noted that nothing in the legislative history contained
"direct evidence that Congress even contemplated coalition
suits, far less intended them."95
The court then addressed the Fifth Circuit's position in
Campos in allowing aggregation as protecting coalitions when
Congress did not intend to do so.96 Quoting the dissenting judge
from Campos, "[t]he question is not whether Congress in the
"

Id. at 1393.

`6

See id.

"

Id. at 1384.
Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386.
See id. at 1386-88.
See id. at 1390-92.
Id. at 1386 (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993)).
Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386.

8
"
90

91
92

e3 Id.
Id. at 1387.
9s Id.
96 Nixon, 76 F.3d at
1388.
9
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Voting Rights Act intended to prohibit such coalitions; instead
the proper question is whether Congress intended to protect
those coalitions."9 7 In the dissent's view, an affirmative grant of
protection is required to prevent courts from regulating
by "fiat."9 8
Additionally, the court discussed policy considerations
surrounding aggregation of minority coalitions.9 9 First, the court
noted that Congress passed the Voting Rights Act for a specific
purpose and upon specific findings of past discrimination and
"exclusion from the electoral process."1 00 As such, there are
naturally some minority groups that are not protected by the
Act because they have no history of being excluded from the
electoral process. 10 1 Thus, extending protection to minority
coalitions should not be assumed; it is best left to Congress to
research and amend if necessary.
There are also situations where minority groups may not
have aligned interests, which casts further doubt on whether
Congress really intended to protect minority coalitions. 102 The
court found the criterion of numerosity implicit in the first part
of the Gingles test, which necessarily means there must be cases
when a minority group would fail to meet this threshold.1 0 3 But
allowing aggregation would almost always allow minority
coalitions to surpass this threshold and could potentially
imbalance the political scales in favor of the minorities.
"Coalition suits provide minority groups with a political
advantage not recognized by our form of government, and not

9 Id. (quoting Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 849 F.2d 943, 944 (5th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
9
Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1388.
Id. at 1390-91.
100

Id.:

[Tihe Voting Rights Act is premised upon congressional 'findings' that each of
the protected minorities is, or has been, the subject of pervasive discrimination
and exclusion from the electoral process. Thus, many minorities in society, e.g.,
Eastern European immigrants or minorities from the Indian subcontinent, are
not protected under the Act. The remedies of the Act only extend to members of
a minority specifically protected by Congress.
101
See id. at 1391 (mentioning only African Americans and Hispanic Americans as
groups with a history of voting discrimination).
102 See id.
103 See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1390-91
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authorized by the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of
that structure." 10 4

C.

Recent Supreme Court Decisions Suggest Support for
Circuit Minority View

Recent Supreme Court decisions show a trend towards
prohibiting aggregation of minority groups. In Bartlett v.
Strickland, the Court declined to expand protection of Section 2
to crossover districts.1 05 "Crossover districts are, by definition,
the result of white voters joining forces with minority voters to
elect their preferred candidate."10 6 The Court reasoned that the
very purpose of the Act was to "foster this cooperation."10 7 if
such cooperation existed and were allowed to join forces to bring
suit under Section 2, it would be "iron[ic]."1 08 The Court
reiterated that "[o]nly when a geographically compact group of
minority voters could form a majority in a single-member
district has the first Gingles requirement been met." 109 Although
in Bartlett, there were white voters joining forces with minority
voters, instead of two minority groups, the bottom line is the
Court did not support the idea of groups joining forces to achieve
the majority status required by Gingles.
In Perry v. Perez,110 the Supreme Court also hints that
minority coalitions are disfavored. The State submitted new
districting plans purportedly due to the population growth in
Texas. The Court noted that the lower court's order suggested
that the State "may have intentionally drawn District 33 as a
'minority coalition opportunity district' in which the court
expected two different minority groups to band together to form
an electoral majority."1 1 1 Another plausible interpretation is that
the districts were drawn in order to accommodate for population
growth. 112 In maintaining that the impetus was unclear, the
Court concluded that "[i]f the District Court did set out to create

10
1o5

Id.

at 1392.
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2009).

106

Id. at 25.

107

Id.

108

Id.

1o

110

Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 26.
132 S. Ct. 934, 944 (2012).

11

Id.

112

Id.
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a minority coalition district, rather than drawing a district that
simply reflected population growth, it had no basis for doing
so."113 Although the case did not raise a Section 2 claim, but was
challenged under Section 5, the sentiments of the Court
regarding minority coalition districts may forecast its feelings
toward minority coalitions in general.
Most recently, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme
Court struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act as
unconstitutional. 1 14 Congress had enacted Section 4(b) as a way
to protect minority voters residing in districts and states with
historically low minority voter turnout and a history of
discriminatory voting practices." These jurisdictions were
subject to federal "preclearance" when enacting new voter laws
or redistricting.1 1 6 With the Section 4(b) coverage provision
eliminated, states are no longer subject to federal preclearance
when amending voting laws. 117 In the absence of the
preclearance requirement, the main way to protect voters from
voting discrimination is Section 2; thus, it is even more
important to ensure that Section 2 is analyzed properly.
IV. SUPPORT FOR THE CIRCUIT MINORITY VIEW

A.

Textual & Institutional Arguments

Section 2 of the Act makes no mention of minority
coalitions. 118 A violation of Section 2 is established if:
[O]n the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political
processes . . . are
not equally open
to
participation by members of a class of citizens . . . . The

extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have

113

Id.

14

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
See id.; see generally Perry, 132 S. Ct. 934.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).

115

us
117

us See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2014).
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members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population." 9
The text clearly states "class" repeatedly in the singular
form.1 2 0 Moreover, the purpose of act is remedial-Congress

enacted it after extensive findings of voting discrimination, and
thus, Congress should be the one to evaluate whether minority
coalitions should be allowed under Section 2.121 A protected class
would not likely ever be in the minority if it were allowed to
aggregate with another minority group to satisfy the Gingles
test. This is based on pure numbers-the ability to aggregate
minorities without limit will necessarily allow them to more
easily satisfy the Gingles numerosity requirement.
The most recent statements of congressional purpose from
the 2006 amendments reiterate the fact that Congress is willing
and able to make findings regarding the necessity of the Act.122
Congress found:
(1) ...

significant progress has been made in eliminating

first generation barriers experienced by minority voters,
including increased numbers of registered minority
voters,
minority
voter
turnout,
and
minority
representation in Congress, State legislatures, and local
elected

offices .

. .

.

(2)

However,

vestiges

of

discrimination
in voting continue to exist as
demonstrated by second generation barriers constructed
to prevent minority voters from fully participating in the
electoral process. (3) The continued evidence of racially
polarized voting in each of the jurisdictions covered by
the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain
politically vulnerable,
warranting
the continued
protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.123

119 Id.
120
121
122
123

See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir.
1996).
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006).
id.
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Congress revisited the Act in 2006 and did not include
minority coalitions, 124 and the courts should not read into a
statute what is not there.
Arguing in support of permitting aggregation, the Fifth
Circuit claims that the absence of any denial of minority
coalitions in the statute means they are permissible. 125 This is
not a correct mode of statutory analysis. As the dissent notes,
Congress' failure to explicitly protect minority coalitions does
not suggest that it chose to protect them. 126 Instead, courts must
find affirmative protections from Congress. This argument
comports with modes of legal interpretation stemming back to
the birth of the Constitution, which requires Congress to give an
affirmative grant of power.127 As such, allowing minority
coalitions requires an affirmative statement from Congress, the
absence of which leaves the courts no choice but to make
Congress act.
Recent Precedent Suggests that the Supreme Court
Supports the Minority View in Nixon

B.

Existing Supreme Court interpretations of Section 2
support a finding that minority coalitions are not included. The
Gingles test presupposes that there will be minority groups who
will not meet the criteria a "minority group must be able to
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in the single-member
district." 128 Additionally, in looking at the other two parts of the
test, which require political cohesiveness and bloc voting, the
theme of homogeneity pervades throughout the Gingles test. The
very definition of minority coalitions contravenes the theme of
the Gingles test and thus, cannot be said to support aggregation.
If minority coalitions were allowed, this could potentially lower

124

See

id.

Campos v. Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
126 See Campos v. Baytown, 847 F.2d 943, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1988) (rehearing denied
en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see also Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1388
(6th Cir. 1996).
127 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (stating that
the
"textual commitment must be a clear one. Congress, we have held, does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it
does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.").
128 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
125
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the ease with which the first Gingles element could be met and
render the first element less of a bar and more of a formality.
There are two additional cases that strongly suggest the
Court would not support minority coalitions under Section 2. In
Bartlett v. Strickland,129 the Court expressly prevented white
voters from joining forces with minority voters in order to form a
majority in a single-member district. The Court was very clear
that such aggregation cannot allow a minority group to meet the
first Gingles requirement. 130 Even though the Court believed
that such cooperation was the very goal of Section 2, it still did
not allow the aggregation of whites and minorities; thus, it
would be even less likely for the Court to allow coalitions
composed entirely of minorities. 13 1 In Perry v. Perez, the Court
found that a district court's redistricting plans strongly
suggested an underlying motive of creating a "minority coalition
district." 132 The court noted that if this were the real motive,
then the district court "had no basis for doing so."133 This line of
reasoning strongly suggests that the Court would not support
aggregation of minority groups under Section 2.134
In maintaining that both the congressional record and
Supreme Court jurisprudence support the circuit majority view
permitting minority coalitions, scholars have pointed to
situations where Congress and the Court expanded rights under
Section 2 or "broadly" interpreted Section 2. First, Congress
expanded the Act to include language-minority groups in
1975.135 Second, the Court in Chisom expanded coverage to suits
alleging a Section 2 violation for the election of judges even
though the statute uses the term "representatives."136 Third, the
Court has assumed that two minority groups could aggregate
even when the issue was moot because it found there was no
political cohesion, as required by the second Gingles element. 137
Although the case has been cited to imply the Court supports

129

130
131
132
133

1'
135
16
137

556 U.S. 1 (2009).
Id. at 25-26.
id.
Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 944 (2012).
Id.
See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 429-30.
See Michaloski, supra note 9, at 293.
See id.
Growe v. Emerson, 507 U.S. 25, 41 n. 5 (1993).
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minority coalitions,1 38 the case is best interpreted as the Court
side-stepping that issue entirely and finding that a different
Gingles element failed. 139
These arguments are unpersuasive and only tangentially
relevant to the issue at hand. First, Congress expanded the Act
to include language-minority groups in 1975, but pointing to an
instance where Congress expanded the statute to languageminority groups does not indicate that Congress would advocate
expanding the Act to permit minority coalitions nor a broad
interpretation of every provision of the statute. In fact, it lends
credence to the argument that this type of determination should
be left to the legislatures to research and decide. Additionally,
Congress expanded the provision to include language-minority
groups in 1975 when voting discrimination was still a significant
problem.1 40 In 2006, Congress noted that there has been
"significant progress."1 4 1 Although voting discrimination still
exists, the political landscape is much different now than in
1975, and the amendments on which the argument relies is also
outdated. Thus, this argument, which is based on the 1975
amendments and data, should be given little to no weight.
Second, the Court in Chisom expanded coverage to suits
alleging a Section 2 violation for the election of judges even
though the statute uses the term "representatives."1 4 2
Expanding Section 2 protection for judicial elections does not
help determine whether the Court would interpret the term
"class" to include minority coalitions. The fact that the Court
chose to interpret "representative" broadly to include judges has
no bearing on whether it would interpret "class" broadly in an
entirely different context. Congress enacted the Act in order to
try and eliminate discrimination in voting practices.1 43 As such,
broadly interpreting "representative" goes to the heart of the
goal, because it should not matter for whom one is voting if the
goal is to ensure equal access to vote. But interpreting "class"
See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 424.
1s9 See Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 n. 5.
14o See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat.
400
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)).
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) (abrogated in part by Shelby Cnty., 133
S. Ct.
2612).
12 See Michaloski, supra note 9, at 293.
14
See generally Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2014)).
138
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broadly has much different consequences. Per Gingles, a
minority group must constitute a majority of the would-be
district to state a Section 2 claim. 14 4 If aggregation of minority
groups were allowed, the threshold to meet this requirement
would be lowered since minority groups can simply join forces to
obtain majority status. Furthermore, because one of the Act's
purpose is remedial, it makes no sense to protect potential
minority groups that may be part of a minority coalition that
may not have been subject to past voting discrimination. 145
Third, the Court has assumed that two minority groups
could aggregate even when the issue was moot because it found
there was no political cohesion, as required by the second
Gingles element. 14 6 The only argument that actually relates to
the issue in question is the one arising from Growe v.
Emerson,147 where the Court declined to address the issue of
minority coalitions. 14 8 Thus, the argument is weak, because the
Court expressly stated that it was "[a]ssuming (without
deciding) that it was permissible for the District Court to
combine distinct ethnic and language minority groups for
purposes of assessing compliance with §2."149 This adds nothing
to Section 2 jurisprudence. The Court expressly stated it was not
making a decision on the permissibility of aggregating minority
groups.15 0 Additionally, the assumptions on which the Court
relied did not affect the outcome of the case.15 1 The only thing
this case expounded is that the Supreme Court assumed a
finding the lower court made, which does not imply the Court
endorses minority coalitions.1 52 At best, it means the Court
wanted to remain silent on the issue.
Thus, any trends toward a broad interpretation fall away. 153
Even assuming these three arguments did in fact weigh in favor
of a broad interpretation, it would be a stretch to say that three

See generally Gingles, 478 U.S. 30; Bartlett, 556 U.S. 1.
See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 1996).
14
Growe v. Emerson, 507 U.S. at 41 n. 5 (1993).
147 507 U.S. (1993).
144

145

14s See generally Growe, 507 U.S. 25.
149 Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
1so

See id.

151

See id.

1512 See Michaloski, supra note 9, at 293.
153 Cf. id.
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data points articulate a trend, especially when the Court has
leaned toward more narrow interpretations. 15 4
C.

In the Aftermath of Shelby County, Courts Must Be More
Vigilant and Strict with Regard to Section 2 Claims

With the advent of Shelby County and the elimination of
Section 4(b), this could mean that minority groups will have to
look to Section 2 to obtain remedies against vote dilution. 15 5
Laws do not exist in isolation and changes to legislation affect
other laws. Before Shelby County, if a court were to allow
minority coalitions, and issued some sort of remedial action
requiring redistricting, for example, any new laws a covered
district wished to enact would require federal government
approval, or preclearance.1 5 6 Shelby County abrogated Section
4(b) and rendered the preclearance requirement inoperative.15 7
Without having to answer to the federal government, the states
are left to their own devices for fashioning remedies they believe
are appropriate. 15 8 No governmental checks on court-mandated
remedies exist now, and since any new state law or redistricting
is no longer subject to federal approval without the coverage
formula under Section 4(b), this power of discretion could be
very dangerous, and even more reason to guard Section 2 claims
more closely.
It is likely that legislatures are in a better position to
understand what is in its citizens' best interest; courts are the
wrong institution to decide issues of great consequence. 159 Even
if the proper remedy were to allow minority coalitions, if the
Court were to decide this incorrectly, this would have a great
impact on the general public. The scales may actually start

154 See generally Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
1,s See Michaloski, supra note 9, at 286 ("The Supreme Court recently invalidated
the Section 4 preclearance requirement of the Act in Shelby County v. Holder, but
emphasized the importance of Section 2 as a permanent and nationwide prohibition
against discriminatory voting practices.").
156 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
157 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
"s' See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627, 641-42(S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014)
(discussing voter identification laws passed in the State).
159 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (enumerating instances when
political questions may arise and situations where courts should not intervene); cf. Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121-25 (1986) (holding that racial gerrymandering was
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause).
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tipping the other way-in favor of minority groups and actually
harming the majority. While on its face, this may seem like a
positive outcome, the very abandonment of Section 4(b) in
Shelby County suggests that the voting discrimination issues are
not as drastic as they once were.16 0 Allowing aggregation of
minority groups could be a drastic intervention that is
unnecessary,
and may actually serve to overprotect
minorities. 161 If minority coalitions were allowed, the ability for
minorities to bring suit under Section 2 and satisfy Gingles' first
element would be much too easy.
Additionally, in Shelby County, the Court did not
manipulate Section 4 to allow for an interpretation that
Congress may not have intended, it held the provision
unconstitutional knowing the power to amend or legislate is in
the hands of Congress. 162 The Court acknowledged that it was
Congress' constitutional right to amend statutes. Should
Congress find that the provision is still required to remedy
lingering discriminatory effects, it can do so and is the proper
institution to perform a holistic review of the current
circumstances of modern day voting dilution issues. 163 This is
especially true when there seems to be a discrepancy between
the level of discrimination that the Court believes exists and the
level of discrimination that actually exists at the state level.1 64
Statistical findings in lower courts suggest that without the
requisite preclearance and oversight of the federal government,
Section 2 could not adequately protect the rights of minority
160

Cf. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630-31 (2013):

There is no valid reason to insulate the coverage formula from review merely
because it was previously enacted 40 years ago. If Congress had started from
scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage formula.
It would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in
such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today's statistics tell
an entirely different story. And it would have been irrational to base coverage
on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been illegal since
that time. But that is exactly what Congress has done.
162

See id.
id.

13

Id.

161

'64
Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 with Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d 848, 86566 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing several statistics where racial discrimination still exists in
voting contexts), and Harris v. Arizona, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1049 (D. Ariz. 2014)
(listing voting statistics in detail by district); see also Veasey, 71 F.Supp.3d at 636-37
(rebutting Chief Justice Roberts' assertions that the current conditions in the South no
longer justified the "extraordinary" measures he summarily struck down).
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voters, specifically in previously covered jurisdictions. 1 6 5 But this
only relates to previously covered jurisdictions and not every
jurisdiction nationwide. Allowing minority coalitions on a
nationwide basis would not solve the problem specific to covered
jurisdictions. If the Court incorrectly characterizes the data or if
it relies upon data that does not fully represent the current
situation, issuance of a decision that has a widespread impact on
the voting rights of the public may result in unintended effects.
Furthermore, an impact of this magnitude cannot be
decided on a case-by-case basis, because the decision will not
only bind the parties privy to the dispute, but future plaintiffs as
well.166 Due to its large reach, Congress is in the best position to
do the necessary research to ensure that amendments to Section
2 will serve the proper remedial service that is intended while
being able to take into account the necessary data and external
information. While at first blush, the effect of Shelby County
would seem to suggest that Section 2 should be given a broader
interpretation, if Shelby County taught us anything, it is that
widespread abrogation of legislation could lead to effects that
the Court, in judging a single dispute, may not fully appreciate
and permitting coalitions is a decision best left to Congress. 6 7
Following this approach, proper deference to Congress achieves
the intended goals and purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment
without as much risk of errors in judicial discretion.
V.

CONCLUSION

Vote dilution has been and still is an ongoing problem in the
United States. For voting issues of this scale, the Constitution
specifically vests Congress with the power to enact legislation to
remedy these discrepancies. Congress used its power to enact
the Act in 1965, and a series of amendments thereafter.
Determining whether minority coalitions are permissible under
Section 2 should be left to Congress, which is in a better position
to take into account the proper data and make an informed
decision. Past amendments, whether broad or narrow, cannot

See Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 872-73.
See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (enumerating instances
when political questions may arise and situations where courts should not intervene).
167 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the
findings of Congress should be given "substantial deference").
165
166
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inform current political trends because past amendments were
based on past statistics to remedy past discrimination.
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of
minority voting coalitions and relying on cases where other
provisions of the Act were broadly interpreted cannot be applied
to inform this situation, because the goals furthered by the other
provisions in the Act are not the same. And, finally, as seen in
Shelby County, the Court's understanding of the climate of
voting discrimination may not align with what is actually
happening, and may require a branch of government with
representatives from all the states to fully appreciate the
breadth of the situation. Thus, the courts should leave the issue
of minority coalitions alone and defer to Congress to clarify.

